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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I.

Whether Fourth Amendment protection against excessive force extends beyond initial
seizure?

II.

If the Court were to apply a rule of continuing seizure to the Fourth Amendment
protection against the use of excessive force, to what point beyond initial seizure
should that protection extend?
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OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion for the United States District Court for the Southern District of Fair is
unreported but may be found in the Record at R. 11-13.
The opinion for the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifteenth Circuit is likewise
unreported but may be found in the Record at R. 16.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The court of appeals entered judgment on March 15, 2010. (R. at 16). Petitioner filed his
petition for writ of certiorari on May 15, 2010. (R. at 17). This Court granted the petition on
October 7, 2010. (R. at 18). This Court’s jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (2006).
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and
42 U.S.C. § 1983 are reproduced in an Appendix to this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The facts that serve as the basis for this action are as alleged in the February 1, 2009
Complaint (R. at 2-4) and are not contested for purposes of ruling on the legal issues presented.
Cf. R. at 11-12 (factual allegations as set forth in the Complaint are accepted as true by the
District Court for purposes of ruling on the defendant’s motion to dismiss).
On September 23, 2008, Petitioner Beau Radley (Radley) was driving home from a
business meeting along Highway X in Fair County. (R. at 3). During that drive, Radley was
pulled over by John Marlin (Marlin), a police officer employed by Respondent Fair County
Police Department (Fair County). Id. Marlin, alleging that Radley was driving drunk, insisted
that Radley take a breathalyzer test. Id. Radley refused the test and was taken into custody by
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Marlin. Id. Marlin handcuffed Radley’s hands behind his back, and Radley was put into the
back seat of Marlin’s squad car. Id. Marlin then took Radley to the Fair Police Station. Id.
Upon arrival at the police station, Radley was escorted by Marlin into the booking room
and handed off to Respondent Arthur Goode (Goode), a police officer also employed by the Fair
County Police Department. Id. Marlin left the booking room and left Radley in the sole custody
of Goode. Id. Radley’s arms were still handcuffed behind his back. Id. Upon Marlin’s exit,
Goode called Radley “scum” and “white trash,” to which Radley gave no response. Id. Radley’s
handcuffs were removed by Goode for the booking process and, upon completion, were recuffed
too tightly. Id. Radley complained to Goode that the handcuffs were too tight. Id. Goode did
nothing to fix the handcuffs. Id.
At this point, Marlin returned to the booking room. Id. Radley complained to Marlin
that the handcuffs were too tight, and Marlin checked and then loosened the handcuffs. Id.
Goode then escorted Radley, whose hands were still handcuffed behind his back, from the
booking room to a holding cell. Id. This entire time Radley was again in the sole custody of
Goode. Id. In the holding cell, Goode pushed Radley to the ground and hit Radley in the back
with his knee. Id. Goode told Radley that he “shouldn’t have embarrassed [Goode].” Id.
Goode threatened that if he had come back, he would make Radley “regret it.” Id.
Hours later, when Radley was certain that Goode was off duty, Radley complained about
his injuries to one of the officers on duty and was taken to the Fair County Hospital for
examination. Id. Radley sustained bruising around his wrists from the handcuffs placed on him
by Goode, as well as a cut lip and bruising along his jaw from being pushed to the ground while
his hands were still handcuffed behind his back. (R. at 4).
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On February 1, 2009, Radley filed a complaint against Goode and Fair County in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Fair alleging that Respondents’ use of
excessive force violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights as enforced by 42 U.S.C
§1983 (2006). (R. at 2-4). On February 13, 2009, Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the
Fourth Amendment component of Radley’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. (R. at 5-7). In their motion to dismiss, Respondents argued
that Fourth Amendment protection does not extend to arrestees, such as Radley, who have
completed the booking process. (R. at 5). Respondents also argued that even if the Fourth
Amendment continues to protect beyond the initial seizure, it cannot continue once an arrestee,
like Radley, is no longer in the custody of the arresting officer. (R. at 6).
On March 1, 2009, Radley filed a memorandum in opposition to Respondents’ motion to
dismiss. (R. at 8-10). In his memorandum, Radley argued that the Fourth Amendment
protection extends at least until an arrestee, like Radley, has been arraigned of formally charged.
(R. at 9).
On March 12, 2009, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Fair, the
Honorable Candice Gorder, USDJ, granted Respondents’ motion to dismiss. (R. at 11-13). The
District Court found that the Fourth Amendment protection continues beyond the initial seizure,
but that such protection extends only while the arrestee, such as Radley, remains in the custody
of the arresting officer. (R. at 13).
On April 1, 2009, Radley filed a notice of appeal with the District Court. (R. at 14). On
April 14, 2009, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifteenth Circuit granted Radley’s
appeal to address the question of whether the Fourth Amendment protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures extends to an arrestee who is no longer in the custody of the
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arresting officer but has yet to be arraigned or formally charged. (R. at 15). On March 15, 2009,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifteenth Circuit, in a per curiam opinion, affirmed the
judgment of the District Court. (R. at 16).
On May 15, 2010, Radley filed his petition for Writ of Certiorari with this Court. (R. at
17). On October 7, 2010, this Court granted Radley’s petition for Writ of Certiorari to address
the following issues: (1) Whether Fourth Amendment protection against excessive force extends
beyond initial seizure; and (2) If the Court were to apply a rule of continuing seizure to the
Fourth Amendment protection against the use of excessive force, to what point beyond initial
seizure should that protection extend? (R. at 18).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
I.
This Court in Graham v. Connor articulated that a Fourth Amendment standard governs a
free citizen’s claim that law enforcement officials used excessive force in the course of making
an arrest, investigatory stop, or other “seizure” of his person. However, the question of whether
the Fourth Amendment continues to provide individuals with protection against the deliberate
use of excessive physical force beyond the point at which arrest ends and pretrial detention
begins was expressly left unanswered. Fourth Amendment protection against excessive force
clearly extends beyond the initial seizure. This Court has previously defined “seizure” as
occurring when, by means of physical force or show of authority, government actors have in
some way restrained the liberty of a citizen. An arrestee awaiting arraignment certainly falls
under this definition. Interpreting this Court’s decision accordingly, a majority of the circuit
courts of appeal, including the Fifteenth Circuit Court of Appeals in this case, have adopted a
Fourth Amendment “continuing seizure” protection against the use of excessive force, holding
4

that “seizure” extends beyond the point of arrest. Such an interpretation is most in keeping with
this Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
II.
Fourth Amendment protection extends at least until an arrestee has been arraigned or
formally charged. In Graham, this Court made clear that a pretrial detainee is protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. However, pretrial detainee status does not begin until post-arraignment,
while the individual is awaiting trial. An arrestee awaiting arraignment who has yet to be given
the opportunity to appear before a judicial officer for a probable cause determination retains his
Fourth Amendment protections. As probable cause has yet to be determined, a more relaxed
standard for excessive force is not appropriate for an arrestee. To hold otherwise is contrary to
the long standing value of presumed innocence and would violate a key component of our
nation’s justice system. Moreover, extending Fourth Amendment protection until arraignment
provides a workable, bright-line rule, setting a clear standard for police officers when
determining the level of force to use in varying situations. By limiting Fourth Amendment
protection to an arrestee only so long as that person is in the custody of the arresting officer, the
Fifteenth Circuit Court of Appeals in this case erred.
ARGUMENTS
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A district court’s fact findings and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from them are
reviewed for clear error. Its legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.
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I.

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION AGAINST EXCESSIVE FORCE
EXTENDS BEYOND INITIAL SEIZURE.
A.

A “Continuing Seizure” Approach Conforms to This Court’s Precedent and
Upholds the Language and Spirit of the Fourth Amendment

The Fifteenth Circuit Court of Appeals properly decided that the Fourth Amendment
continues to protect arrestees beyond their initial seizure. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 confers a cause of
action to those persons who have been deprived of their rights by another person acting under the
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State, including claims of
excessive force by police officers. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). In Graham v. Connor this Court
held that all excessive force claims brought under § 1983 are not governed by a single generic
standard. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393 (1989). Instead, this Court decided an analysis
of a section 1983 claim begins by identifying the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed
by the challenged application of force. Id. at 394. The Fourth and Eighth Amendments are the
two primary sources of constitutional protection against physically abusive governmental
conduct. Id. The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable seizures of the person. U.S.
CONST. amend. IV. The Eighth Amendment bans cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. C ONST.
amend. VIII. Courts have interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment as protecting citizens in the
period between “seizure” and “punishment.” See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395, n.10. The
Constitutional protections against excessive force for a person arrested, detained, and then
convicted vary depending on the person’s status. Fourth Amendment protection applies to
excessive force claims that arise in the context of an arrest, investigatory stop or other “seizure”
of a free citizen. Id. at 395. Eighth Amendment protection applies to prisoners post-conviction.
See id. at 394. The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee from
the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment. Id. at 395 n.10. The Fourteenth
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Amendment’s Due Process Clause provides that no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. As the arrestee moves
through the criminal justice system, his constitutional rights vary, as do the standards for judging
his claims against excessive force. A Fourth Amendment claim is judged by an “objective
reasonableness” test, a Fourteenth Amendment claim under a “shocks-the-conscience” standard,
and an Eighth Amendment inquiry turns on whether the force amounts to “unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain.” See Graham, 490 U.S. at 393-99. However, this Court expressly left
undecided the question of whether the Fourth Amendment continues to provide individuals with
protection against the deliberate use of excessive force beyond the point at which arrest ends and
pretrial detention begins. Id. at 395 n.10.
Petitioner Beau Radley’s excessive force claim falls under the Fourth Amendment’s
umbrella. In Terry v. Ohio this Court defined “seizure” as occurring when by means of physical
force or show of authority, government actors have in some way restrained the liberty of a
citizen. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968). This language implies that seizure is not an
exact point in time, but a continuum relating to the time in which the liberty of the citizen is
restrained. Furthermore, this Court has extended “seizure” not only to when an officer arrests an
individual, but also whenever an officer restrains the freedom of a person to walk away.
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985). At the time Radley’s excessive force claim arose, he
did not have the freedom to walk away and therefore was still undergoing “seizure” when his
excessive force claim arose. Also, nowhere in the language of the Fourth Amendment is there a
suggestion that a different standard for “unreasonableness” should apply when analyzing
excessive force in a post-arrest situation versus pre-arrest conduct. The letter of the Constitution
does not provide for or imply such a distinction, and this Court should decide accordingly. The
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Fourth Amendment explicitly provides protection against the sort of physically intrusive
governmental conduct to which Radley was exposed, and should therefore be the guide to
analyzing excessive force claims arising during “seizure.” See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395.
In Graham, the petitioner Dethorne Graham, a diabetic, brought a Section 1983 claim
when law enforcement officers used physical force against him during the course of an
investigatory stop. Id. at 388. During the investigatory stop, one of the officers shoved
Graham’s face against the hood of the car, and four officers then grabbed Graham and threw him
headfirst into the police car. Id. at 389. It reasonably follows from the facts of the case that
Graham was already under the control of the police officers at the time the force occurred. See
Id. This Court decided a Fourth Amendment standard was most appropriate for those
circumstances. See id. at 395. By deciding to use a Fourth Amendment standard for a person
already under the control of a police officer, this Court effectively employed a “continuing
seizure” approach.
B.

The Majority of Circuit Courts Have Adopted a “Continuing Seizure”
Doctrine Applying the Fourth Amendment’s Objective Reasonableness Test
to the Use of Force by Police Officer After the Initial Arrest

Since Graham, the majority of circuits deciding the issue, including, now, the Fifteenth
Circuit, have adopted a “continuing seizure” doctrine applying the Fourth Amendment’s
objective reasonableness test to the use of force by police officers after the initial arrest. See,
e.g., Aldini v. Johnson, 609 F.3d 858, 866 (6th Cir. 2010) (until a probable cause hearing);
United States v. Johnstone, 107 F.3d 200, 206-07 (3d Cir. 1997) (“seizure” is a continuum that
can extend beyond the initial restraint); Austin v. Hamilton, 945 F.2d 1155, 1162 (10th Cir. 1991)
(until the arrestee’s first judicial hearing) Powell v. Gardner, 891 F.2d 1039, 1044 (2d Cir. 1989)
(at least to arraignment and remains in custody of the arresting officer).
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Very few courts have rejected the “continuing seizure” doctrine. See, e.g., Riley v.
Dorton, 115 F.3d 1159, 1164 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc); Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440,
1443 (5th Cir. 1993); Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190,194 (7th Cir. 1989). However, these cases
can be distinguished and should not be followed in this case. In Valencia, the court held that the
Fourth Amendment test is inappropriate only when the official use of force occurs after the
incidents of arrest are completed, after the plaintiff has been released from the arresting officer’s
custody, and after the plaintiff has been in detention awaiting trial for a significant period of
time. Valencia, 981 F.2d at 1443-44. In that case, the plaintiff’s excessive force claim arose
during an incident that occurred three weeks after his arrest while he was still in detention
awaiting trial. Id. at 1442. In the case at hand, Radley had only been in custody for a few hours
when Goode used excessive force, a miniscule period of time as compared to Valencia. A few
hours in custody is not a significant period of time, so Radley’s Fourth Amendment rights had
not expired, even under the Valencia standard, at the moment excessive force was used. See id.
Furthermore, the Valencia standard requires that the detainee be awaiting trial when his Fourth
Amendment rights expire. Id. at 1444. Radley had not yet been arraigned or even formally
charged at the time Goode used excessive force, so he was not “awaiting trial.”
The Fourth Circuit in Riley, relied upon this Court’s decision in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520 (1979), claiming that Bell instructs the court to analyze excessive force under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and not the Fourth Amendment. Riley, 115 F.3d at
1162. However, this cannot be the case, as Graham, decided ten years after Bell, expressly
declined to decide whether Fourth Amendment protection applies between arrest and pretrial
detention. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n.10. Also, the plaintiff in Riley was arrested pursuant
to a valid warrant, so probable cause had already been established. See Riley, 115 F.3d at 1161.
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Radley had not yet been arraigned, formally charged, nor had a probable cause hearing been held
with regards to his arrest. The Seventh Circuit decided Wilkins before this Court decided
Graham. Applying a now obsolete test, the court in Wilkins decided that the plaintiff, a person
arrested but not charged or convicted, was protected by the Due Process Clause, not the Fourth
Amendment. See Wilkins, 872 F.2d at 193. However, one year later, and after Graham, the
Seventh Circuit held that the Fourth Amendment will determine the standard of force on a person
in custody most of the time. See Titran v. Ackman, 893 F.2d 145, 147 (7th Cir. 1990).
This Court should follow the trend of the United States Courts of Appeals and uphold the
Fifteenth Circuit’s decision that the Fourth Amendment continues to protect arrestees beyond
their initial seizure. Such an interpretation is most in keeping with this Court’s Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.
II.

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION AGAINST UNREASONABLE
SEIZURE EXTENDS AT LEAST UNTIL AN ARRESTEE HAS BEEN
ARRAIGNED OR FORMALLY CHARGED.
A.

Radley’s Status at the Moment Excessive Force Was Used Does Not Fall
Under This Court’s Definition of Pretrial Detainee, So His Claim Is Best
Analyzed Under a Fourth Amendment Standard.

In Graham, this Court made clear that a pretrial detainee is protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n.10. However, Radley was not a pretrial detainee when
Goode used excessive force against him. Pretrial detainee status does not begin until postarraignment, while the individual is awaiting trial. Radley was arrested without a warrant, and
had not yet been arraigned, formally charged, nor had a probable cause hearing been held on his
behalf. In Bell, this Court defined a pretrial detainee as one who has not been adjudged guilty of
any crime, but only has had a judicial determination of probable cause. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. at 536. Radley had not yet had a judicial determination of probable cause, therefore he was
not yet a pretrial detainee, and it is more appropriate to judge his claim by a Fourth Amendment
10

standard. Radley, when struck by Goode, could best be classified as an arrestee. As previously
mentioned, the majority of circuit courts apply the Fourth Amendment, “objective
reasonableness” standard to arrestees under the “continuing seizure” approach. Therefore, as
Radley does not fall under this Court’s definition of pretrial detainee, he is an arrestee and any
excessive force claims made by an arrestee should be judged by the Fourth Amendment
standard.
B.

A More Relaxed Force Standard Is Not Appropriate For an Individual Prearraignment.

After arrest the Fourth Amendment applies, after arraignment the Fourteenth Amendment
applies, and after conviction the Eighth Amendment applies. Each standard places a higher
burden on the plaintiff than the preceding standard. See Aldini, 609 F.3d at 864. An arrestee
protected by the Fourth Amendment must prove that the government agent’s use of force was
objectively unreasonable, while under a Fourteenth Amendment claim, plaintiff must prove the
use of force “shocks-the-conscience.” See Graham, 490 U.S. at 393-94. An individual being
processed through the criminal justice system is subjected to an increasingly relaxed standard of
force. When arraignment and a probable cause hearing have yet to be performed, a more relaxed
standard for force is not appropriate. To hold otherwise is contrary to the long established
presumption of innocence and would violate a key component of our nation’s justice system.
Additionally, establishing the line between the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment protection at
the probable cause hearing or arraignment creates an incentive to hold the hearing as soon as
possible, which is certainly beneficial to the judicial process as it would minimize the time a
presumptively innocent individual spends in jail. Aldini, 609 F.3d at 867.
In Albright v. Oliver, this Court, deciding whether a Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment
right is violated when a citizen is arrested without probable cause, held the petitioner’s Fourth
11

Amendment right to freedom from seizure was the violated constitutional right. Albright v.
Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). Justice Ginsburg, in a concurring opinion, employed the
“continuing seizure” approach and argued that a person is effectively seized until trial, because
such a person is “scarcely at liberty” during the pretrial period. Id. at 279 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring). Even though Albright did not involve an excessive force claim, it is clear Justice
Ginsburg sought to extend Fourth Amendment protection of an arrestee until trial, due to the fact
that his liberty is still being restrained by the state.
C.

The “Arresting Officer” Rule Is Arbitrary and Unprecedented in This
Court’s Jurisprudence, and Therefore Should Not be Utilized When
Determining an Arrestee’s Constitutional Rights.

The Fifteenth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the “arresting officer” rule, thus holding
that the Fourth Amendment protection extends only while the arrestee remains in the custody of
the arresting officer. The court based its decision on the standards set out in the Second and
Sixth Circuits. See, e.g., Powell v. Gardner, 891 F.2d 1039, 1044 (2d Cir. 1989) (Fourth
Amendment standard should probably apply until arraignment, and remains in the custody of the
arresting officer); McDowell v. Rogers, 863 F.2d 1302, 1306 (6th Cir. 1988) (Fourth Amendment
seizure continues while the person remains in the custody of the arresting officers). However,
whether the arrestee is in the custody of the arresting officer is not the proper standard for the
Fourth Amendment protection. There is nothing in the language of the Constitution or in this
Court’s precedent that makes a distinction in the application of Constitutional rights on the basis
of whether an individual remains in the custody of the arresting officer. Furthermore, the Sixth
Circuit has since applied a Fourth Amendment standard to arrestees detained following a
warrantless arrest prior to a probable cause hearing, regardless of whether arrestee was in the
custody of the arresting officer. Aldini, 609 F.3d at 867.
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Also, it seems the circuit courts that have looked to the “arresting officer” as a guideline
for determining the extent of seizure, did not intend to make it the delimiting point for seizure in
all situations of arrest. In Powell and McDowell, looking to the custody of the arresting officer
was appropriate in each case because each plaintiff was in the custody of the arresting officer at
the time the alleged excessive force occurred. See Powell, 891 F.2d at 1041; McDowell, 863
F.2d at 1304. Therefore, the circumstance of the arrestee remaining in the custody of the
arresting officer should not be considered the final inquiry as to whether the Fourth Amendment
continues to protect such an arrestee.
Moreover, in Garner, this Court held that “seizure” occurs not only when an officer
arrests an individual, but also whenever that officer restrains the individual’s freedom to walk
away. Garner, 471 U.S. at 7. An arrestee remaining in the custody of the arresting officer is not
necessary for that arresting officer to continue to restrain the arrestee’s freedom to walk away.
When an arresting officer transfers custody to another officer temporarily or when the officer
places the arrestee in a jail cell, that officer is still restricting the movement and freedom of the
arrestee. Thus, the more appropriate standard is that embraced by the Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuits, which hold that the Fourth Amendment applies to a person arrested without warrants
until a probable cause hearing is held. See, e.g., Aldini, 609 F.3d at 867 (set the dividing line
between the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment zones of protection at the probable-cause
hearing); Pierce v. Multnomah County, 76 F.3d 1032, 1043 (9th Cir. 1996) (with a warrantless
arrest, the Fourth Amendment extends until arrestee is released or a probable cause has been
established); Austin, 945 F.2d at 1160 (Fourth Amendment applies to the treatment of arrestees
detained without a warrant). Since at the moment of excessive force Radley had been detained
without a warrant and had not yet been arraigned, he was still protected by the Fourth
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Amendment and, as such, has a cause of action under the Fourth Amendment as enforced by 42
U.S.C. § 1983.
D.

A Bright-line Rule Extending Fourth Amendment Protection Until
Arraignment Would Provide a Workable Standard to Guide Police Officers
as to What Type of Force They Can Use and When They Can Use It.

Adopting a “continuing seizure” approach which extends seizure until at least
arraignment would provide police officers a delineation as to what type of force they can use and
when they can use it. Erica Haber, Demystifying a Legal Twilight Zone: Resolving the Circuit
Court Split on when Seizure Ends and Pretrial Detention Begins in § 1983 Excessive Force
Cases, 19 N.Y.L Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 939, 966 (2003). Citizens should feel secure in their right to
be free from excessive force, and police officers should be provided with a clear framework for
the amount of force they are permitted to use in any given situation. Such a clear, bright-line
rule will provide both citizens and police officers a reasonable expectation of the amount of force
police officers are permitted to use. Armed with a proper guideline for appropriate force, police
officers will adjust and implement the corresponding appropriate force in a particular situation.
Hopefully, this will result in fewer lawsuits, relieving a small part of district courts already overcrowded dockets.
Extending seizure until arraignment provides a bright-line rule that would provide a
workable standard for police officers. Unlike the arresting officer rule, arraignment represents
an important procedure in the criminal justice system where the accused is presented with his
crime and a judicial officer reviews the probable cause. An arraignment is evidence of the value
our society places on the presumption of innocence. It is also a set point in time which allows all
parties to clearly understand the nature of the proceeding and the rights involved.
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This Court should adopt a bright-line approach, extending seizure until arraignment, and
reject the Fifteenth Circuit’s “arresting officer” approach. This approach is most consistent with
the presumption of innocence and this Court’s precedent.
CONCLUSION
The Fourth Amendment protection against excessive force extends beyond the initial
seizure at least until an arrestee has been arraigned or formally charged. For the aforementioned
reasons, Petitioner Beau Radley urges this Court to affirm the Fifteenth Circuit Court of Appeals
as to the recognition of a “continuing seizure,” but reverse it as to its use of the “arresting
officer” as the delimiting point, and direct that the case be remanded to the District Court for
proceedings consistent with this Court’s order.
Respectfully submitted,

STEPHANIE MILLER
One Camino Santa Maria
San Antonio, Texas 78228
(210) 555-1234
Counsel for Petitioner
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APPENDIX

APPENDIX
FOURTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons of things to be seized.
EIGHTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted.
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person or life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law.
42 U.S.C. § 1983
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in
any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial
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capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or
declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress
applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the
District of Columbia.
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